我院李光宇博士

在《Humanities＆Social Sciences Communications》发表论文

我院土地资源管理系助理李光宇撰写的论文《Governments’ behavioral strategies in cross-regional reduction of inefficient industrial land: learned from a tripartite evolutionary game model》被《Humanities ＆ Social Sciences Communications》录用并发表。

论文题目：Governments’ behavioral strategies in cross-regional reduction of inefficient industrial land: learned from a tripartite evolutionary game model

期   刊 ：Humanities ＆ Social Sciences Communications

摘   要 ：Disorderly urban expansion has resulted in inefficient industrial land, impeding sustainable urban development. Reducing inefficient industrial land (RIIL) is crucial for controlling pollution and bolstering industrial vitality. However, previous studies have overlooked the quantitative analysis of the intergovernmental interest game involved in cross-regional RIIL, essential for determining project outcomes. This study employs evolutionary game theory to explore the decision-making behavior and stabilization strategies of three stakeholders, including the superior government and two local governments in cross-regional RIIL. First, a tripartite evolutionary game model was formulated. We then examined the evolutionarily stable strategies and their associated conditions. Finally, case analysis and numerical simulation illustrated the government's behavioral strategies and their sensitivity to influencing factors in cross-regional RIIL. The results indicate that positive benefits encourage local governments to cooperate. The superior government's supervision strategy can compel local governments to collaborate on cross-regional RIIL. Optimizing the allocation ratios of the project and enhancing potential benefits can mitigate the negative effects of special funding disparities, thereby fostering intergovernmental cooperation. Ensuring the efficiency of cross-regional RIIL projects requires strengthening social consensus, improving formal institutions, and optimizing governance institutions.

中文摘要（翻译）：无序的城市扩张导致了低效的工业用地，阻碍了城市的可持续发展。低效工业用地减量化（RIIL）对于控制污染和增强产业活力至关重要。然而，现有研究往往忽视了区域间RIIL过程中涉及的政府间利益博弈的定量分析，而这对于项目成效的实现具有关键作用。本文引入演化博弈理论，探讨在跨区域RIIL过程中，上级政府与两个地方政府三方主体的决策行为及其稳定策略。首先，构建了一个三方演化博弈模型；其次，分析了演化稳定策略及其实现条件；最后，通过案例分析与数值模拟，揭示了政府在跨区域RIIL中行为策略的演化过程及其对关键影响因素的敏感性。研究结果表明，正向收益有助于激励地方政府协作开展RIIL工作；上级政府的监督策略可以促使地方政府在区域协同中加强合作；通过优化项目收益分配比例、提高潜在收益，有助于缓解专项资金差异带来的不利影响，进一步推动政府间协同治理。实现跨区域RIIL项目的高效推进，需要加强社会共识、健全正式制度，并优化治理机制。

李光宇博士简介

 浙江财经大学公共管理学院助理研究员，硕士生导师，中共党员，博士。主要讲授高级计量方法理论与应用，智慧城市与管理技术等课程。主持国家自然科学基金1项，参与国家社会科学基金重大项目、浙江省自然科学基金重点项目等省部级及以上项目4项， 在《Applied Geography》、《Catena》、《Science of The Total Environment》等国际期刊上发表10余篇文章。